Russian threat perceptions are part of an inheritance heavily shaped by geography and a history of troubled relations with other major European powers.
Second, American policymakers and experts have long paid too little attention to the drivers of Russia’s external behavior. leaders ignored Russia’s objections and underestimated the lengths to which Russian counterparts were prepared to go to secure the homeland against perceived threats. This was a particular problem when the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) pursued several rounds of enlargement in the 1990s and early 2000s under U.S. The perception that Russia’s decline was so deep and irreversible that it would no longer be able to resist Western initiatives made it difficult to accept Moscow’s pushback against Western policies. For many Western observers, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the implosion of Russian power demonstrated the permanent superiority of the United States. The first factor is the lingering euphoria of the post–Cold War period. policy going forward is grounded in the most realistic understanding of the challenge that Russia poses and the right kinds of tools that the United States should use to contend with it. By unpacking the analytical assumptions that underlie these misconceptions, President Joe Biden’s administration and other important policy players will be better equipped to ensure that U.S. All of them continue to affect contemporary policymakers’ approach to a deeply troubled relationship with Moscow. Three factors largely account for this problem. policy misfires in dealing with Russia and its intentions and capabilities over the past several decades is long overdue. Your browser does not support the audio element. Listen to Aaron David Miller, Eugene Rumer, and Richard Sokolsky discuss the importance of getting Russia right for U.S.
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